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This paper models policy responses to changes in solvency by Dutch 
occupational pension funds using a unique panel dataset containing the 
balance sheets of all registered pension funds in the Netherlands over a period 
of 15 years (1993–2007). The model describes how nominal pension rights are 
expanded, by e.g. indexation or backservice, or, on the contrary, how the 
current pension accumulation is skimmed, e.g. by setting the pension premium 
over its actuarially fair price to build buffers. Policy responses are explained by 
the funding ratio and other pension fund characteristics such as pension funds´ 
size and type, and participants’ ages. We find that pension rights are expanded 
in line with the funding ratio, but that the pension funds’ response function 
exhibits two sharp and significant behavioural breaks, close to the minimum 
funding ratio of 105% and the target ratio of around 125%. These levels also 
play a pivotal role in current supervisory regulation. We further find that large 
    pension funds and grey funds are relatively generous to participants.  
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1  Introduction 
The Dutch pension sector is large with 514 registered pension funds (at end-2010), controlling an 
invested wealth of more than 746 billion euro, that is, 126% of the Dutch GDP. This population of 
pension funds is very heterogeneous in terms of size. The largest fund, ABP, has about 2.8 million 
participants and controls 208 billion euro (ABP, 2010), whereas some small pension funds have 
fewer than 10 participants. 
Depending on the type of contract, all pension funds face uncertainties with respect to their 
benefits, stemming from the rate of return on their assets, the mortality rate of their participants, 
the inflation rate, wage growth and, in the Netherlands since 2007, the market-based interest rate 
term structure for discounting. If the value of the pension funds’ assets declines relative to the 
current value of their liabilities, pension fund boards can use different instruments to reduce the 
gap.  In  case  of  a  funding  shortfall,  the  board  can  add  a  surcharge  to  the  pension  premium, 
suspend indexation to wage or price inflation or adjust the asset mix to limit further downside 
risks. As a final measure, a pension fund board may cut accrued benefits. Financial support from 
the associated company, if one exists, requires the permission of this ‘sponsor’, as such action is 
rarely or never enforceable. When a pension fund´s assets exceed liabilities comfortably, the fund 
can provide indexation, raise benefits or lower pension premiums, or the sponsor may receive part 
of the excess return as a reverse financial support, something which happened regularly in the 
1990s. 
Despite the size of the Dutch pension sector and its impact on the economy, relatively little is 
known about the use pension funds make of these risk sharing instruments. To fill this gap is the 
primary objective of this paper. Specifically, we wish to investigate how the average Dutch pension 
fund’s policy plan responds to changes in its solvability. A second research question is whether a 
predictable relationship exists between known properties of the pension fund – such as its age 
structure, its size, and the presence of an external sponsor – and the way it handles solvency 
problems. 
To assess how the solvency governance of a pension fund is conducted in practice, we use a 
unique  dataset  from  the  Dutch  central  bank  (‘DNB’)  which  supervises  pension  funds  in  the 
Netherlands. Every pension fund has to submit yearly and quarterly reports to DNB, in which it 
outlines its financial position. The more detailed yearly reports constitute our dataset, together 
with balance sheets of all registered pension funds in the Netherlands for the 1993 to 2007 period, 
15 years in total. They do not, however, specify the actual use of such risk sharing instruments as 
are listed above. The dataset has been used earlier by Bikker, Broeders, Hollanders & Ponds (2011) 
in a study on the asset allocation of pension funds. These authors show that the type of assets 
held is correlated significantly with the age of the fund’s active participants. Bikker, Broeders & De 
Dreu (2010) and De Dreu & Bikker (2009) use a quarterly version of this dataset to argue that the 3 
 
asset management of large pension funds is markedly different from that of small pension funds, 
which may apply less sophisticated risk management. 
We use the reported financial and miscellaneous data to investigate the relationship between the 
assets and the liabilities of pension funds. This allows us to estimate whether changes in a fund’s 
funding  ratio  are  absorbed  by  its  buffers  or  by  additional  participants’  pension  rights.  We 
condition these policy actions on time and on the pension fund’s characteristics. As expected, we 
find a positive relation between the funding ratio and the generosity of the pension fund, in terms 
of  granting  new  pension  rights.  However,  our  main  finding  is  the  existence  of  a  strong  non-
linearity in pension funds’ policy response to their funding ratio. When the ratio falls below 105%, 
pension fund participants – active workers, inactive participants and retirees – see their rights 
promptly impaired by, e.g., withheld indexation. Secondly, we observe that the pension fund´s 
average age of participants and number of retirees correlate positively with its generosity. Lack of 
data prevents us from determining whether this is due to pressure from the older participant 
through  labour  unions  to  increase  benefits  or  to  avoid  reductions  in  indexation,  or  to  other 
reasons. We also find that larger funds are more generous — possibly the benefit of returns to 
scale. Finally, company pension funds are observed to be, on average, more generous compared 
to industry-wide funds, ascribed to the sponsor relations of the former. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the Dutch occupational pension 
system. Section 3 introduces the dataset and our method for recovering pension policy from the 
available data. Section 4 then specifies the models used to describe the impact of the pension 
funds’ solvability and their policy responses, and presents estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
2  The Dutch occupational pension system 
As  in  most  developed  countries,  the  institutional  structure  of  the  pension  system  in  the 
Netherlands is organized as a three-pillar system. The first pillar comprises the public pension 
scheme,  financed  on  a  pay-as-you-go  base.  It  offers  a  basic  flat-rate  pension  to  all  Dutch 
inhabitants above the age of 65. The benefit level is linked to the statutory minimum wage. The 
second  pillar  consists  of  fully  funded  ‘supplementary’  pension  schemes  managed  by  pension 
funds. The third pillar comprises tax-deferred personal savings, which individuals undertake on 
their own initiative. 
The Dutch pension system is unique as regards the relative size of the second pillar. It covers 94 
percent of all employees. The value of assets under management at the end of 2010 amounted to 
746 billion euro, or 126 percent of the Dutch GDP. More than 85 percent of all pension funds are 
of the company pension fund type. Of the remaining 15 percent, most are industry-wide funds. 
Participation  in  industry-wide  pension  funds  is  (under  certain  conditions)  mandatory  for  all 4 
 
employers in a particular sector. An employer can opt out only if it establishes a company pension 
fund that offers a better pension plan to its employees than the industry-wide fund. The circa 95 
industry-wide pension funds are the dominant players, both in terms of active participants (market 
share above 85%) and in assets under management (over 70%). In 2007, almost 600 company 
pension funds encompassed over a quarter of the assets, serving 12 percent of plan participants. A 
small number of generally small professional group pension funds form the third type of pension 
funds, organized for a specific group of professionals such as physicians or notaries. 
Bovenberg et al. (2007) present several reasons for the existence of the funded pension schemes, 
explaining the services they provide in excess of what individuals can organize themselves. The 
pension funds act as cost efficient asset managers, allow young people to leverage their human 
capital, enable intergenerational risk-sharing and  provide non-traded quasi-assets. In addition, 
they may fulfil a paternal role for participants with myopic tendencies, in that workers cannot opt 
out of the fund associated with their employer, industry sector or profession. 
The supplementary or occupational pension system in the Netherlands, the subject of this paper, 
is organized mainly in the form of funded defined benefit (DB) plans. The benefit entitlement is 
determined by years of service and a reference wage, which may be final pay (as during most 
years of our sample) or the average wage over the years of service, as is nowadays most common. 
As  corporate  sponsors  do  not  have  a  legal  obligation  to  cover  shortfalls  in  the  respective 
company’s pension fund, the residual risk is borne by the participants themselves.
1 Obviously, the 
same applies to participants in other types of pension funds. This type of plan may also be labelled 
as hybrid rather than DB, since it has both defined benefit and defined contribution traits. It is 
partly DB by nature, in that the yearly accrual of pension rights is specified in the same way as in a 
traditional DB plan, but at the same time it has defined contribution (DC) features, in that the 
yearly indexation to price or wage inflation is linked to the financial position of the fund and, 
therefore, to its investment returns. 
The  defined  benefit  formula  takes  the  public  –  first  pillar  –  scheme  into  account.  Shocks  in 
investment returns are first absorbed by the pension fund buffer, next DB pension funds adjust 
pension contributions and indexation of accrued benefits as instruments to restore the funding 
ratio. Whereas higher contributions weigh on active participants, lower indexation hurts older 
participants most.
2 The less flexible these instruments are, the longer it takes to adjust the funding 
ratio, and the more strongly will shocks be borne by active participants and shared with future 
participants. 
                                                           
1 Although there is no legal obligation, a corporation may experience a moral obligation to participate in 
sharing the losses of its pension fund. Where the corporation adopts this role, we refer to it as the sponsor 
of the plan. Also note that the Netherlands has no pension guarantee fund as opposed to e.g. the US, the UK 
and Germany.  
2 In an average wage defined benefit scheme, the accrued pension rights of active participants are often also 
subject to conditional indexation. 5 
 
3  The data 
Each year, a pension fund must report an extensive, prescribed set of variables to DNB, which 
exercises supervision on the sector.
3 The number of pension funds declined during the period 
under our observation. The solid line in Figure 1 shows the decline from over 1,000 funds in 1993 
to 623 in 2007. The main cause of this decline is a process of mergers and liquidations, possibly 
driven  by  increasing  regulatory  demands  on  pension  funds  and  unused  scale  economies  (see 
Bikker & De Dreu, 2009; Bikker, Steenbeek & Torracchi, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1: The number of pension funds in the dataset and the number of funds actually used in the analysis 
per year. 
This  paper  uses  a  subset  of  the  available  data,  comprising  pension  funds  with  at  least  150 
participants. We exclude smaller funds because many of them are tax vehicles for e.g. company 
owner-managers,  and  their  small  size  may  limit  their  capacity  to  pursue  solvency  policies. 
Excluding  smaller  funds  eliminates  almost  half  the  sample  in  1993.  As  Figure  1  shows, 
consolidation and liquidation reduced the number of excluded funds over time. The number of 
funds included in our analysis rose initially, and in the final year of our sample, close to 80% of the 
registered funds met our selection criterion. 
                                                           
3 Until 2004, pension funds had to report to the ‘Pensioen- en Verzekeringskamer’. This supervisor merged 
with the Dutch central bank in 2004. The anonymised data used for this research were obtained from De 
Nederlandsche Bank in cooperation with Statistics Netherlands, subject to DNB's disclosure policies, see 
http://www.dnb.nl/en/statistics/statistische-microdata/index.jsp. Anonymisation makes it impossible to link 
the  dataset  to  data  available  from  other  sources  like  pension  funds’  annual  reports  and  websites.  The 
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  Size classes based on number of participants 
Year  150–500  500–1k  1k–10k  10k–100k  100k+  Total 
1993  163  103  220  74  16  576 
1994  173  105  219  76  15  588 
1995  186  114  222  74  17  613 
1996  172  117  234  74  17  614 
1997  171  115  240  74  18  618 
1998  178  109  242  72  17  618 
1999  167  102  248  71  17  605 
2000  165  98  271  70  18  622 
2001  158  102  285  71  21  637 
2002  151  93  285  77  21  627 
2003  145  96  275  83  22  621 
2004  129  94  272  88  21  604 
2005  119  86  274  89  22  590 
2006  93  79  253  86  20  531 
2007  76  75  232  86  18  487 
Table 1: Number of pension funds by size — in number of participants — over time. 
After our selection, the sample still includes pension funds of very different sizes as shown in Table 
1. The number of small funds (150–500 participants) declines over time, whereas the number of 
large funds (10k–100k and 100k+) increases. The smaller funds either merged into a bigger fund or 
transferred their liabilities to an insurance company, and hence disappeared from our dataset. 
After a merger in year t, we discard the receiving fund in years t and t+1, to avoid large shocks in 
the technical reserve figures. Most mergers and terminations concern funds that were too small to 
be included in the analyses, that is, below 150 participants.
4  
Each year, pension funds must report on the following items, all in current euro or number of 
participants: 
1.  Technical  reserve  (   ).  This  is  the  actuarial  value  (using  standard  life  tables)  of  the 
liabilities the fund has incurred. Up to 2006, liabilities were discounted by a fixed 4% 
interest rate. From 2007, liabilities have been discounted using market based interest 
rates. 
2.  Assets (  ), at market value, split into five categories: fixed income, real estate, stocks, 
bonds, and other. Dividing total assets by the technical reserve gives the funding ratio, the 
main indicator of financial health. 
                                                           
4 A more detailed description of how we handle mergers and cessations is available from the authors upon 
request. 7 
 
3.  Benefits (  ) paid out in the current year, split into straight pension benefits, survivor 
pension benefits, and disability pension benefits. 
4.  Premiums (  ) received in the current year, split into premiums paid by employers and by 
employees. 
5.  Participants  divided  into  three  categories;  active  participants,  retirees  and  deferred 
participants (‘sleepers’). The latter are former active participants who no longer contribute 
premiums, but have not yet reached the age of retirement. They may have quit the labour 
force, moved to a different pension fund or suffered a decrease in wage income that puts 
them below the level of eligibility. 
 
 
Figure 2: The age distributions for different types of participants in 2007 (in numbers of pension funds)  
We know little about the participants of pension funds, except for their classification as active 
(working), retired or deferred. Only for the last year in our dataset, 2007, we also have the number 
of active participants, retirees and sleepers split into 5-year cohorts. This data gives us an idea of 
the demographic structure of each fund. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average age of 
pension fund participants for each member type. Table 2 shows the average and median ages 
across types of funds and types of participants, where the two measures are quite similar. Retirees 
are, of course, much older than the other participants but, on average, deferred participants are 
only slightly older than the active participants. If anything, the 80 industry-wide pension funds 
have, on average, a slightly younger active population than the 399 company pension funds and 
the eight other funds. 
 
  All  Industry  Company  Others 
# of funds  487  80  399  8 
Active average (median)  44.3 (43.8)  44.2 (42.8)  44.3 (44.1)  45.3 (42.6) 
Sleeper average (median)  46.3 (46.1)  46.8 (47.0)  46.1 (46.0)  49.1 (47.3) 
Retired average (median)  68.7 (70.1)  69.4 (70.7)  68.5 (69.9)  71.3 (71.1) 




























Figure 3: Retired participants per active participants of the fund, for different fund types. 
Figure 3 shows the ratio of retired participants over active participants for the sector as a whole 
and for the three different types of pension funds. The ageing process is clearly visible as the ratio 
for the Netherlands rises from 35% in 1993 to 47% in 2007. Until the mid 1990s early retirement 
was made very attractive in the Netherlands, lowering the number of active participants and, if the 
pension fund offered an early retirement scheme, increasing the number of retired. In the late 
1990s the government made early retirement less attractive, which resulted in a drop in the 
retired/active  ratio  (Euwals,  Van  Vuuren  &  Wolthoff,  2005).  The  ratio  for  the  ‘other’  (mostly 
professional) pension funds follows a volatile path mainly because this group is small and because 
mergers with and cessations to industry-wide pension funds have a big impact. 
3.1  Recovering behaviour 
The dataset consists mostly of balance sheet items per fund and per year, but does not reveal such 
pension  fund  policy  parameters  as  premium  rates  or  degrees  of  indexation.  The  latter  is  an 
instrument that can be used to influence the level of benefits immediately. In Dutch DB plans, the 
benefits are specified and guaranteed in nominal rather than real terms. These nominal rights are 
used to determine a fund’s technical reserves. Each year, the pension fund board decides whether 
to increase benefits and rights in line with the pension plan’s stated indexation ambition, that is, 
adjustment to the general price level or to the contract wages in the sector. This discretionary 
room  for  manoeuvre  affords  the  board  some  limited  leeway  on  the  obligation  side.  Outright 
nominal devaluation of existing rights is considered only when all other measures fall short. As 
uniform information on changes in the provided pension policy is lacking, we will use the financial 
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We aim to unearth facts about pension funds’ insurance policies by observing unexpected changes 
in individual funds’ liabilities. Until 2007, pension funds used a fixed 4% discount rate to discount 
their future liabilities (a figure that had not changed since 1969). Since 2007, pension funds are 
required to use the market swap rate. Many large pension funds and part of the other funds used 
this market rate already in 2006. This caused a clear structural break in the data, as we also will 
observe later, which is why we drop the observations from 2006. This leaves us with a sample in 
which the discount rate r is fixed, so the technical reserves are equal to 
      =  
  , 
(1 +  )   
 
     
  (1) 
with   ,  the benefits the fund expects it has to pay to its retirees in year  , given the information 
and accumulated rights in year  . 
The technical reserves by the end of period   + 1,      , can be decomposed into the remaining 
technical reserves from the previous period after this period’s payouts and the present value of 
the change in expected future payouts. 
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(2) 
The value of the change in expected payouts consists of (i) a term to reflect that old liabilities are 
now discounted less (1 +  ), (ii) changes in the expected future benefits (    ,  −   , ), and (iii) 
the removal of benefits paid out this year (  ,   ). The change in expected benefits comes from 
the addition of new rights, but also from newly granted indexation, revaluations due to updated 
mortality tables, transfers, mergers and acquisitions. Note that the expected payout in period 
  + 1 may differ from the actual payout, defined as     , for the same reasons. 
Observation of the pension related cash flows, that is, the premium income and the actual pension 
payout,  and  the  current  development  in  the  technical  reserves,  allows  us  to  define  Γ,  the 
unexpected changes in the technical reserve, which acts as an indicator of the pension fund´s 
policy actions: 
  Γ  ≡       −  (1 +  )    +      −        (3) 
Substitution of Equation (2) into Equation (3) gives: 10 
 
  Γ  ≡  (1 +  )  
    ,  −   , 
(1 +  )   
 
     
−       +       −   ,      (4) 
This links the policy action indicator Γ to unexpected changes in future payouts during the current 
period due to policy choices. The first term in parentheses shows the difference between the 
present value of the change in future benefits and this year’s premium payments. Regulation 
requires that for the fund as a whole, on average, total premium payments to the fund should be 
equal to the expected present value of the new entitlements, the so-called self-funding premium.
5 
The second term in parentheses shows the difference between expected pension payouts at the 
beginning of the year and actual payouts.  
This Γ is an indicator of net transfers between the pension fund and its participants. If pension 
contributions exceed the present value of the change in expected payouts and/or actual payouts 
are lower than expected, then there is a net transfer from the participants to the fund, indicated 
by a negative Γ. If the Γ-indicator is positive, what occurs more frequently, there is a net transfer 
from the fund to its participants. These transfers can take many different forms: 
•  The fund increases the accumulated nominal pension rights (indexation or backservice
6). 
•  Contributions  do  not  match  the  actuarial  value  of  new  rights,  for  instance,  due  to  a 
recovery premium mark-up designed to increase the funding ratio, or to pension holidays. 
•  The present value of accumulated pension rights changes, e.g. due to changes in the 
expected mortality rate. If mortality decreases, and pensioners receive a life annuity, their 
claim on the fund increases in value. 
•  Mergers or individual transfers of participants. 
•  Deviation of the actual mortality of the fund’s participants from the average mortality rate 
occurs. 
Note that changes in the value of the liabilities (due to changes in mortality), when taken on board 
by the pension fund, can be seen as a transfer regardless of whether money changed hands in the 
current year. Changes in liabilities due to external factors show that the fund is the owner of the 
respective risk, and serve to insure its participants. Such changes, therefore, imply policy actions. 
In this sense, only the last two items do not point directly to a transfer between the fund and its 
participants.  The  assumption  we  make  in  the  subsequent  analysis  is  that  these  shocks  are 
orthogonal to the funds’ financial position. 
The policy action indicator Γ depends on the size of the fund. To make it comparable between 
funds, we scale it with the level of the technical reserves: 
                                                           
5 The premium may also include a recovery premium mark-up designed to increase the funding ratio. 
6 Backservice is the change of the pension rights due to a change in the actual wage of the participants in a 
final wage scheme. 11 
 
     ≡
Γ 
   
=
      −      +     
   
− (1 +  )  (5) 
This method of measuring insurance policy action does not allow us to see who the beneficiaries 
or victims of the pension rights transfers are. More specifically, we cannot distinguish whether a 
transfer affects the active or the retired participants of the fund. 
4  Estimating pension policy reactions 
To determine the impact of a fund’s solvency on its pension policy, we estimate the relationship 
between the fund’s net transfer to its participants ( ) and the funding ratio    ,  =   ,     ,  ⁄ . 
Transfers between the fund and its participants are conditional on the financial state of the fund; 
in fact, levying extra premiums or moderating rights indexation in times of reduced solvency, and 
vice versa, are widely used policy measures. If we can recover this relationship, this would confirm 
that    is a useful indicator of transfers. The characteristics of this relationship may tell us more 
about the reaction of funds’ pension policies to their funding ratios. Is the marginal effect of a 
change in the funding ratio constant as in a linear relationship, or non-linear, e.g. do regime breaks 
exist? 
4.1  The impact of the funding ratio 
In its simplest form, the relation we estimate is 
    ,  =    +     ,  +   ,   (6) 
We use the panel dataset at our disposal to estimate a pension fund specific fixed effect    that 
accounts  for  the  fact  that  different  pension  funds  may  take  different  approaches  to  plan 
sponsorship, leading to different average rates of pension transfers. 
Figure 4 shows the relation between the median   and the median one-year lagged funding ratio 
over time. As this figure shows, there is a positive relation between these two variables from the 
first observation in 1994 until 2005. The years 2006 and 2007 show a clear break, which can be 
explained by changes in solvency regulation in 2007: pension funds must use the market swap rate 
to discount their future liabilities, instead of the fixed 4% discount rate.
7 The discount rates in 
2006 and 2007 were well above 4% for all maturities, resulting in lower technical reserves, which 
                                                           
7 To measure the effect of a market based term structure on a fund’s technical reserves, taking the maturity 
of  the  liabilities  into  account,  one  needs  to  know  the  demographic  composition  of  the  pension  fund’s 
participants and their individual pension rights. As this information is not available in our dataset, we cannot 
reproduce the technical reserve using the fixed interest rate from the figure computed with the market rate. 12 
 
explains the low  ’s in these years. Because of this change in the calculation of the technical 
reserves, we exclude the years 2006 and 2007 from our estimations. 
 
 
Figure 4: The median lagged funding ratio versus the median   
In  preliminary  estimations  we  experimented  with  the  lag  structure  of  Equation (6).  Using  the 
current funding ratio to explain   is not realistic as pension funds take pension policy actions only 
after new information on their solvency is released, that is not until the next year.
8 Using the 
lagged value of the funding ratio (  ) takes care of this, but there is no reason to include it as the 
only explanatory variable. In principle, the value of    two (or more) years lagged can be included 
and may provide extra information on the impact of the funding ratio. In all specifications used, 
however, we find that adding extra lags of    does not contribute to the explanatory power of the 
model. 
Apart from the funding ratio we have indicators of the demographic composition of the pension 
fund, its size and its type. However, those variables show little or no variation beyond a simple 
time trend. This means that we can only estimate fixed-effect panel regressions with the funding 
ratio as single explanatory variable. We start with this strategy, and later continue to explore 
models with more explanatory variables but without fixed effects. 
Regulation in the Netherlands as in force since 2007 assigns special meaning to funding ratios of 
105% (minimum requirement) and around 127% (long term requirement for a standard pension 
                                                           
8 The current funding ratio is also problematic from an econometric point of view as this variable would 
result in a spurious regression. Indeed, unexpected changes in the level of fund obligations – through e.g. 




































Median Lagged Funding Ratio13 
 
fund with 50% equities and 50% bonds; this buffer is necessary for e.g. full indexation).
9 These 
thresholds reflect existing common sense: a pension fund needs a funding ratio well above 100% 
to remain solvent, while a larger buffer is needed for in the long run. They are also the result of a 
long  negotiation  process  between  the  supervisor,  the  government  and  representatives  of 
employers and employees. Preliminary information on the new regime circulated since 2002. Long 
before 2007, pension funds may have changed their behaviour if their funding ratio fell below 
these  special  values,  even  before  they  were  given  their  formal  status  in  the  new  regulatory 
regime. The threshold methodology of Hansen (1999, 2000) allows for such changes in pension 
funds´ policy regimes. For a one-threshold specification with varying intercept and coefficient, the 
estimated equation changes to: 
    ,  =  
  
  +      ,    +   , ,    ,    ≤  
  
  +      ,    +   , ,    ,    >  
   (7) 
where the level of the threshold   is estimated simultaneously with the other parameters. 
We estimate various panel fixed effects versions of the threshold model with one and two breaks; 
a  third  break  was  not  statistically  significant.  Figure  5  and  Figure  6  show  the  estimated 
relationships for respectively the one- and two-break models. 
Figure 5 shows the estimates of five variants of Equations (6) and (7): (i) Equation (6) without a 
jump, (ii) a step function with just the average level before and after a single break, (iii) Equation 
(7) with varying intercepts with the same coefficient of the funding ratio before and after the 
break, (iv) Equation (7) with regime specific gradients but equal intercepts, and (v) Equation (7) 
with regime specific intercept and gradient. Figure 6 shows the same specifications, but with two 
possible breakpoints. The appendix presents the exact specification of all the estimated equations. 
Note that these are all fixed effects results which give each fund its own intercept. Table 3 and 
Table 4 report the estimated coefficients for respectively the one- and two-break models in more 
detail. 
The first result is that the growth of additional pension rights increases significantly with the 
funding ratio.
10 This confirms our obvious expectations and validates our indirect approach. The 
   
                                                           
9  The  required  funding  ratio  of  around  127%  for  a  standard  pension  fund  is  determined,  so  that  the 
probability of underfunding within one year is limited to 2.5%. 
10 Note that the coefficient of the funding ratio (FR) in Table 3 after T indicates how the coefficient of FR 
changes after the break. So, for the ‘no common coefficients’ variant the coefficient is 0.480 before the 
break and 0.480-0.379=0.101 after the break. 14 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimated relationship between   and the lagged funding ratio with one break. 
second outcome is that this positive effect of the funding ratio on the pension fund´s generosity is 
not  linear  but  exhibits  statistically  significant  breaks  or  jumps.  This  result  is  robust  across  to 
various specifications used. A point estimate for the first break is either at 102% or 104% in both 
the one-break and the two-break specifications. The jump at the first break is between 3 and 6 
 
    Type of model   






Constant  -0.153 [-8.5]  -0.046 [-6.4]  -0.163 [-9.1]  -0.127 [-6.9]  -0.543 [-2.7] 
Funding ratio  0.126 [9.0]    0.103 [7.1]  0.053 [2.7]  0.480 [2.4] 
Threshold (T)    105%  105%  102%  105% 
F value    59.3  29.6  28.8  33.2 
P (no break at T)     <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
Constant (≥T)    0.062 [7.7]  0.045 [5.4]    0.428 [2.1] 
Funding ratio (≥T)        0.056 [5.4]  -0.379 [-1.9] 
Jump at T     6.2%pt  4.5%pt  5.7%pt  3.2%pt 
Number of obs.  1637  1637  1637  1637  1637 
obs < T    210  210  114  210 
obs ≥T    1427  1427  1523  1427 
R
2  0.056  0.042  0.076  0.075  0.078 




















percentage points in all specifications, with an average of 4.8 percentage points in the one-break 
specifications  and  4.9  percentage  points  in  the  two-break  specifications.  The  second  jump  is 
estimated at a funding ratio between 125% and 132%, depending on the specification. The jump is 




Figure 6: Estimated relationship between   and the lagged funding ratio with two breaks. 
These  estimation  results  show  that  the  relationship  between  a  pension  fund’s  transfer  to  its 
participants  and  its  funding  ratio  is  nonlinear.  When  the  funding  ratio  falls  below  105%,  the 
transfer rate   drops about 4 percentage points. Less robust, but still significant, is the nonlinearity 
around a funding ratio of 130%, where the transfer rate makes another jump of around half that 
size. Between the two jumps, there exists a weak, positive, relation between the pension transfer 
indicator   and the funding ratio. 
The form of the relationship between the funding ratio and the transfer indicator   shows the 
existence of distinct pension policy regimes on either side of the thresholds. Below the 105% 
threshold, funds transfer significantly less to their participants. In this situation, a net transfer from 
participants to the fund is more likely. This changes dramatically when funds cross the threshold 
and the situation is seen as quite safe. At that point, there is only a weak impact of funding on 
transfers.  A  second  behavioural  change  occurs  at  high  funding  levels,  where  transfers  to 
participants are increased but with a lesser (though statistically significant) jump. 
The location of the first break can be explained by a desire to stay solvent. Although participation 



















immediately, pension funds aim to possess sufficient assets to cover their liabilities. The second 
break coincides with the solvency requirement where under new regulation pension funds are also 
allowed to provide full indexation to prices or wages. 
 
  Type of model 






Constant  -0.153 [-8.5]  -0.057 [-7.8]  -0.125 [-6.0]  -0.062 [-2.4]  -0.239 [-0.9] 
Funding ratio  0.126 [9.0]    0.063 [3.4]  0.002 [0.1]  0.162 [0.6] 
Threshold (T1)    105%  105%  105%  102% 
F value    46.0  32.0  33.2  12.3 
P (no break at T1)     < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  <0.05 
Constant (≥T1)    0.055 [6.8]  0.047 [5.7]    -0.010 [-0.0] 
Funding ratio (≥T1)        0.048 [5.8]  0.050 [0.2] 
Jump at T1     5.5%pt  4.7%pt  5.0%pt  4.1%pt 
Threshold (T2)    125%  125%  125%  132% 
F value    51.0  12.2  10.4  22.6 
P (no break at T2)     < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01  <0.01 
Constant (≥T2)    0.040 [7.1]  0.025 [3.5]    0.247 [4.3] 
Funding Ratio (≥T2)        0.019 [3.2]  -0.180 [-4.0] 
Jump at T2     4.0%pt  2.5%pt  2.4%pt  1.0%pt 
Number of obs.  1637  1637  1637  1637  1637 
obs < T1    210  210  210  114 
T1 ≤ obs < T2    703  703  703  969 
obs ≥T2    724  724  724  554 
R
2  0.056  0.076  0.084  0.082  0.091 
Table 4: Estimated relationship between   and the lagged funding ratio with two breaks. (t-values within 
brackets) 
The transition from final wage to average wage schemes during 2002-2004 when, after the end of 
the dot-com bubble, the funding ratio fell below the lower threshold, has influenced the response 
instruments of the pension funds. Under a final wage scheme pension entitlements increase with 
the wages of the active participants, the so-called backservice. Under an average wage scheme, 
such backservice is absent, so that in the presence of wage growth no automatic increase occurs 
of the technical reserves. This limits the increase in pension entitlements, hence contributes to a 
possible lower gamma.  17 
 
4.2  Role of demographics, type, and size of the pension fund 
In the previous section we regressed   on the lagged funding ratio with fund specific fixed effects. 
These fixed effects indicate that some pension funds are systematically more generous in their 
transfers to the participants than others. This section explains these differences between funds 
from observables such as the average age of the fund’s participants, the shares of the various 
classes  of  participants,  and  the  type  or  size  of  pension  fund.  These  characteristics  are  either 
roughly constant over time – the type of a fund does not change, and member shares only change 
very gradually – or we only have observations for the last year in our sample. This means that we 
cannot run fixed-effect panel regressions, as the coefficient on the observables would not be 
identified. Instead we resort to pooled regressions, where we do not estimate a fixed ‘average 
transfer rate’ for each individual pension fund. The additional variables will pick up (part of the) 
systematic differences between pension funds. 
4.2.1  Demographics 
For 2007 we have the number of participants per category – active, deferred, and retired – in five-
year age cohorts. From these cohort sizes we can proxy the average age of each group; Figure 2 
already  provided  an  overview  of  these  age  distributions.  Table  5  provides  the  relationship 
between the average ages and   for various specifications of the link between   and the lagged 
funding ratio. Note that by using the 2007 age distribution in regressions about earlier years, we 
assume that the demographic characteristics tend to be constant. That is, we use the fact that 
demographic measures generally move slowly over time and assume that the participants´ age 
distribution in 2007 contains information on the (relative) average ages of participant types in 
earlier years. The empirical results demonstrate that this assumption makes sense. 
Table 5 shows that if the average age of the retired increases 10 years, the pension fund´s transfer 
indicator   over the entire sample is, on average, 2.1 percentage points higher per year. In such a 
grey pension fund, the (older) participants have interest in generous transfers, as the risks are 
shifted to the (further) future. The age effect of active participants is also negative: an increase in 
the  age  of  active  participants  implies  a  decrease  of     of  3.0  percentage  points.  The  young 
participants  of  such  a  green  pension  fund  can  bear  risks  better:  negative  shocks  can  be 
compensated by working more hours a week, or by postponing retirement, so this pension fund 
may be more generous. These joint effects show a U-shaped pattern when generous behaviour is 
plotted against  the  average  age of  a  pension  fund´s  participants.  Finally,  the  inclusion of  the 
average age instead of a fund-specific fixed effect has no significant effect on the relation between 
the lagged funding ratio and  : the size of the coefficients, the location of the breaks and the size 
of the jump are all similar to the fixed effect regressions in Section 4.1.  
Another indicator of the demographics of a pension fund is given by the relative shares of active 
participants, inactive participants and retirees. Table 6 shows again that older funds — with a 18 
 
larger share of retirees — have a higher average  . The shares of the active, sleepers and retirees 
add up to 1, forcing us to drop one variable; we select the share of the sleepers. The share of the 
active participants does not have a significant effect on   in any specification, but the share of the 
retirees does: its coefficient is significant at the 1% level in all specifications. A 10 percentage 
points bigger share of the retired increases   by an average of 1.3 percentage points. 
 
    Type of model   
   No threshold  Common coefficients  No commons 
Constant  -0.207 [-6.2]  -0.222 [-6.7]  -0.227 [-1.0] 
Funding ratio  0.063 [6.3]  0.007 [0.4]  0.063 [0.3] 
Age active  -0.0030 [-4.8]  -0.0029 [-4.7]  -0.0030 [-4.8] 
Age deferred  0.0028 [3.6]  0.0025 [3.4]  0.0024 [3.2] 
Age retirees  0.0021 [3.9]  0.0021 [3.8]  0.0021 [3.9] 
Threshold (T1)    102%  102% 
Constant (≥T1)    0.043 [4.5]  -0.011 [-0.1] 
Funding ratio (≥T1)      0.041 [0.2] 
Threshold (T2)    125%  125% 
Constant (≥T2)    0.026 [3.5]  0.151 [2.4] 
Funding Ratio (≥T2)      -0.107 [-2.0] 
Number of observations  1168  1168  1168 
obs < T1    81  81 
T1 ≤ obs < T2    571  571 
obs ≥T2    516  516 
R
2  0.095  0.119  0.122 
Table 5: Effect of the participants’ ages on transfers ( ) 
Both indicators of the ‘age’ of a pension fund’s participants point in the same direction: grey funds 
have higher transfer rates to participants. From our data we cannot infer which group stands to 
benefit from this transfer. It could be due to lower pension premiums or higher indexation. Note 
that it is not the level of the payout that creates this higher   (grey funds always have large 
outflows simply because they are in the payout phase), but the ratio of benefits over technical 
reserves. Note also that retirees do not generally have a formal vote in pension fund boards. A 
possible explanation is that the employee representatives (e.g. labour unions) take the interests of 
retirees into account in order to obtain higher indexation. 
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    Type of model   
   No threshold  Common coefficient  No commons 
Constant  -0.073 [-4.2]  -0.066 [-3.1]  0.103 [0.6] 
Funding ratio  0.041 [4.0]  -0.012 [-0.8]  -0.184 [-1.1] 
Share active  0.004 [0.3]  0.010 [0.6]  0.011 [0.7] 
Share retirees  0.123 [5.6]  0.125 [5.8]  0.123 [5.7] 
Threshold (T1)    102%  102% 
Constant (≥T1)    0.053 [5.2]  -0.222 [-1.3] 
Funding ratio (≥T1)      0.266 [1.5] 
Threshold (T2)    125%  132% 
Constant (≥T2)    0.022 [2.8]  0.163 [2.9] 
Funding ratio (≥T2)      -0.116 [-2.6] 
Number of observations  1637  1637  1637 
obs < T1    114  114 
T1 ≤ obs < T2    799  969 
obs ≥T2    724  554 
R
2  0.048  0.068  0.071 
Table 6: Effect of group share on transfers ( ) 
4.3  Size and type of pension funds 
Table  7  shows  the  regression  results  if  we  include  the  logarithm  of  the  total  number  of 
participants as a measure of size alongside the lagged funding ratio. The results show that larger 
funds have a higher  ; the coefficient for our sample averages 0.5%. This implies that the rate of 
transfer from a pension fund with one million participants is 1.2 percentage points higher than 
that of a fund with 10,000 participants. The effect of the size is significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. Inclusion of the pension fund size has no significant effect on the coefficients or 
breaks of the lagged funding ratio. The first break always occurs between 101% and 104%, the 
second break lies between 124% and 132%. 
A possible explanation for this higher   are the economies of scale these bigger funds have (see 
Bikker & De Dreu, 2009). Lower costs imply that a larger part of the paid premiums can be used to 




    Type of model   
   No threshold  Common coefficient  No commons 
Constant  -0.096 [-5.2]  -0.084 [-3.7]  0.083 [0.5] 
Funding ratio  0.053 [5.1]  -0.008 [-0.5]  -0.177 [-1.0] 
Log size  0.0048 [3.0]  0.0053 [3.3]  0.0051 [3.2] 
Threshold (T1)    102%  102% 
Constant (≥T1)    0.055 [5.3]  -0.250 [-1.4] 
Funding ratio (≥T1)      0.292 [1.6] 
Threshold (T2)    125%  132% 
Constant (≥T2)    0.026 [3.3]  0.206 [3.7] 
Funding ratio (≥T2)      -0.148 [-3.3] 
Number of observations  1637  1637  1637 
obs < T1    114  114 
T1 ≤ obs < T2    799  969 
obs ≥T2    724  554 
R
2  0.020  0.043  0.047 
Table 7: Effect of pension funds’ sizes on transfers ( ) 
Finally, Table 8 shows the results if we include type of fund dummies. We classify each fund into 
one of three types: industry-wide pension funds, company pension funds and ‘others’. This third 
category consists of professional group funds (including non-academic occupational groups) and 
three special funds created for legal reasons. Since every fund has a type and funds typically do 
not change type, we cannot include dummy variables for all three types in the regression model. 
We only observe the difference between the first two types and the ‘others’ as baseline. 
Table 8 shows that industry-wide pension funds, on average, have a 6.2 percentage points to 6.8 
percentage points lower   than company pension funds. The other coefficients do not change 
significantly  and  the  jumps  at  the  thresholds  remain  of  the  same  magnitude.  One  potential 
explanation for the relative generosity of company pension funds is that they have the support of 
a sponsor which may help to absorb negative shocks. 
5  Conclusions 
This  paper  investigates  how  pension  rights  are  adjusted  in  response  to  developments  in  the 
pension funds’ funding rate. Changes in pension rights are not recorded systematically, but we use 
a sample of more than 1,000 Dutch pension funds from 1993 to 2007 to proxy changes in pension 
rights per pension fund and per year. We exclude funds with fewer than 150 participants, as they  
 21 
 
    Type of fund   
   No threshold  Common coefficient  No commons 
Constant  -0.044 [-2.6]  -0.031 [-1.4]  0.109 [0.4] 
Funding ratio  0.053 [5.1]  -0.001 [-0.1]  -0.141 [-0.5] 
Industry-wide fund  -0.081 [-5.5]  -0.075 [-5.1]  -0.076 [-5.3] 
Company fund  -0.012 [-1.1]  -0.012 [-1.1]  -0.014 [-1.2] 
Threshold (T1)    102%  102% 
Constant (≥T1)    0.049 [4.7]  -0.253 [-0.9] 
Funding ratio (≥T1)      0.285 [1.0] 
Threshold (T2)    125%  137% 
Constant (≥T2)    0.023 [3.0]  0.207 [3.9] 
Funding ratio (≥T2)      -0.159 [-4.0] 
Number of observations  1610  1610  1610 
obs < T1    111  111 
T1 ≤ obs < T2    783  1038 
obs ≥T2    716  461 
R
2  0.045  0.063  0.067 
Table 8: Effect of types of pension funds on transfers ( ) 
generally have different objectives, and we drop observations from the years 2006–2007 because 
a new pension regime introduced in 2007, and already widely applied in 2006, causes a break. 
Using a panel data approach, the first finding is that pension rights increase with the funding rate, 
in line with expectations. On average, an increase of the funding ratio by 10 percentage points 
adds  1.0  percentage  point  to  the  participants’  pension  rights.  The  second  finding  is  that  this 
relationship between newly assigned pension rights and the funding ratio includes two highly 
significant breaks. When the funding ratio falls below 105%, the transfer of pension rights drops by 
4  percentage  points.  When  the  funding  ratio  reaches  130%,  the  transfer  rate  increases  by  2 
percentage points. These breakpoints in the 1993-2005 sample exhibit a remarkable coincidence 
with essential funding levels in the new regulatory regime, which has been developed during but 
was established after the sample period: the funding ratio of 105% is a minimum requirement, 
whereas a ratio of around 125-130 is the required level for a standard pension fund, needed for 
e.g. full indexation. 
If we expand our model with additional explanatory  variables such as the age distribution of 
participants, the type of participants and the type of pension fund, we lose the panel structure 
with pension-fund specific fixed effects, as these additional explanatory variables have limited or 
no variation over time. Using pooled regression, we find that indicators of the average age of a 
pension fund’s participants have a positive impact on the funds’ generosity. With respect to types 
of participants, the share of retirees is an especially important determinant. A possible explanation 
is that participants of higher age cohorts have more influence, because they are overrepresented 22 
 
in labour unions. Apparently, the instrument of adjusting indexation, which has a greater effect on 
the technical reserve, the higher the share of retirees is, dominates the instrument of pension 
premium adjustment, which regards the active participants only. We also find that larger funds are 
more generous, possibly reflecting better scale efficiency. Finally, company pension funds are 
more generous than industry-wide funds, likely because the first type has the benefit of a de-facto 
risk absorbing sponsor company. Al these extensions of our model confirm our earlier results of 
increasing pension rights when funding rates are higher and the existence of two highly significant 
breaks at plausible funding rate levels and with substantial jumps. 
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Appendix: Estimated equations 
We estimate the following one break specifications: 
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For the two break specifications, we estimate: 
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